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ABSTRACT 
Bots are social media accounts that automate interaction 
with other users, and they are active on the StrongerIn-
Brexit conversation happening over Twitter. These 
automated scripts generate content through these platforms 
and then interact with people. Political bots are automated 
accounts that are particularly active on public policy issues, 
elections, and political crises. In this preliminary study on 
the use of political bots during the UK referendum on EU 
membership, we analyze the tweeting patterns for both 
human users and bots. We find that political bots have a 
small but strategic role in the referendum conversations: (1) 
the family of hashtags associated with the argument for 
leaving the EU dominates, (2) different perspectives on the 
issue utilize different levels of automation, and (3) less than 
1 percent of sampled accounts generate almost a third of all 
the messages. 
 
FROM SOCIAL BOTS TO POLITICAL BOTS 
A growing number of political actors and governments 
worldwide are employing both people and bots to engage in 
political conversations online.[1]–[3] Bots can perform tasks 
that range from legitimate, like generating a large amount of 
benign tweets that deliver news or update feeds, to more 
malicious, like spreading spam by delivering appealing text 
content with the link-directed malicious content. Whatever 
their uses, all bots share the property of being able to deploy 
messages and replicate themselves.[4]  
 
Networks of such bots are called “botnets,” a term 
combining “robot” with “networks” and describing a 
collection of connected computers with programs that 
communicate across multiple devices to perform some task. 
There are legitimate botnets, like the Carna botnet, which 
gave us our first real census of device networks,[5] and there 
are malicious botnets, like those that are created to launch 
spam and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and 
to engineer theft of confidential information, click fraud, 
cyber-sabotage, and cyberwarfare.  
 
Social bots are particularly prevalent on Twitter, but they are 
found on many different social media platforms that 
increasingly form part of the system of political 
communication in many countries.[6] They are computer-
generated programs that post, tweet, or message of their own 
accord. Often bot profiles lack basic account information 
such as screen names or profile pictures. Such accounts have 
become known as “Twitter eggs” because the default profile 
picture on the social media site is of an egg. While social 
media users get access from front-end websites, bots get 
access to such websites directly through a code-to-code 
connection, mainly through the site’s wide-open application 
programming interface (API) that enables real-time posting 
and parsing of information. 
 
Bots are versatile, cheap to produce, and ever evolving. 
“These bots,” argues Rob Dubbin, “whose DNA can be 
written in almost any modern programming language, live 
on cloud servers, which never go dark and grow cheaper by 
day.”[7] Unscrupulous internet users now deploy bots 
beyond mundane commercial tasks like spamming or 
scraping sites like eBay for bargains. Bots are the primary 
applications used in carrying out distributed denial-of-
service and virus attacks, email harvesting, and content theft. 
A subset of social bots are given overtly political tasks and 
the use of political bots varies across regime types. Political 
actors and governments worldwide have begun using bots to 
manipulate public opinion, choke off debate, and muddy 
political issues. Political bots tend to be developed and 
deployed in sensitive political moments when public opinion 
is polarized. How have bots been used in the political 
conversations about the UK’s role in the EU? 
 
TWITTER BOTS AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
Twitter has become a powerful communication tool during 
many kinds of crises, political or otherwise. When drug wars 
reemerged in Mexico recently, neither the drug lords nor the 
government expected a network of real-time war 
correspondents to spring up to report battles between 
police and gangs. Tweeting certainly didn’t stop the drug 
war. But it helped people to cope. We can’t measure how 
important the sense of online community provided by active 
social media use can be when modern voters discuss politics. 
And while the quality of deliberations over social media can 
appear base, social media is one mode of several modes of 
deliberation that contemporary voters have. Over social 
media like Twitter, a few citizens often rise to the occasion, 
curating content and helping to distinguish good information 
from bad.[4, p. 22], [8] 
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In the case of the StrongerIn-Brexit debate, the two single 
most active accounts from each side of the debate are bots. 
These accounts, @ivoteLeave and @ivotestay, follow a 
similar algorithm.  Neither generates new content, they 
mechanically retweet messages from their side of the debate. 
Another surprise bot is @Col_Connaughton, a long-running 
pro-Palestine bot that seems to have been repurposed to 
support the Brexit side. It is not clear if there is any human 
curation involved, but it certainly uses automation.  Another 
pro-Palestinain bot is @Rotenyahu, which has been tasked 
to retweet messages from Col_Connaughton account so it 
too is distributing #Brexit content.  These are good examples 
of bots designed to amplify a source simply by aggregating 
and repeating content. 
 
SAMPLING AND METHOD 
This data set contains more than 1.5 million Tweets collected 
June 5-12, 2016, using a combination of pro-leave, pro-
remain and neutral hashtags to collect the data. This 
sampling strategy yielded 313,832 distinct Twitter user 
accounts. Since our purpose is to discern how bots are being 
used to amplify political communication on this important 
policy question, we did some basic descriptive analysis to 
understand the rhythm of social media activity on this topic. 
 
The flow of bot traffic varies  during political crises. But for 
our sample period, Figure 1 presents the daily rhythm of 
Tweets on the UK referendum. Given the limits that Twitter 
places on researchers, it is impossible to report the total 
number of bots engaged in the StronterIn-Brexit debate.[10]  
 
Twitter provides free access to a sample of the public Tweets 
posted on the platform. The exact sampling method is not 
known, but according to Twitter, the data available through 
the Streaming API is at most one percent of the overall 
global public communication on the platform at any given 
time.[9] In order to get the most complete and relevant data 
set, the tweets were collected by following a list of hashtags. 
The list of hashtags was generated by downloading two 
smaller data sets and extracting the hashtags that were most 
often used on both sides of the Brexit debate as well as some 
of the neutral hashtags used to refer to the EU referendum. 
The programming of the data collection and most of the 
analysis were done by using the statistics package R. 
 
Selecting tweets on the basis of hashtags has the advantage 
of capturing the content most likely to be about this 
important political issue (and excluding, in our experience, 
Eurovision-related tweets). The streaming API yields (1) 
tweets which contain the keyword or the hashtag; (2) tweets 
Figure 1: Daily Rhythm of Tweets on the UK Referendum, June 5-12, 2016, in Thousands 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Twitter sample of these hashtags June 5-12, 2016. 
Note:  This table reports the number of Tweets, hour by hour, during the sample period. 
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with a link to a web source, such as a news article, where the 
URL or the title of the web source includes the keyword or 
hashtag; (3) retweets where the text contains the original 
text, and the keyword or hashtag is used either in the retweet 
part or in the original tweet; and (4) retweets where the 
original text is not included but Twitter uses a URL to refer 
to the original tweet. From our data set, for example, appears 
this tweet: 
 
“Ask Sam to get your stuff packed 
then, @David_Cameron 
https://t.co/ysoqi9MoQ0”  
 
It uses no hashtag, but the URL leads to the original tweet 
that uses #voteleave and #takecontrol. 
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
With this sample, we can draw some conclusions about the 
character and process of political conversation over Twitter 
on this topic. Specifically, we can parse out the amount of 
social media content related to the various positions in the 
debate, and we can investigate how much of this content is 
driven by bots. We can parse out the volume of tweets by 
perspective, assess the level of automation behind the 
different perspectives, and evaluate the particular 
contribution of bots to traffic on this issue. 
 
First, to evaluate the social media content on Twitter about 
the UK referendum we can do some simple analysis of the 
frequency that particular hashtags are used by users—or 
bots—to signal their perspective and locate their post in 
larger conversations. Table 1 reveals the frequency of use for 
ten hashtags that are usually associated with #StrongerIn 
arguments, ten that are usually associated with #brexit 
arguments, and five that are relatively neutral. 
 
Our method counted tweets with selected hashtags in a 
simple manner. Each tweet was coded and counted if it 
contained one of 25 specific hashtags that were being 
followed. If the same hashtag was used multiple times in a 
tweet, this method still counted that tweet only once. If a 
tweet contained more than one selected hashtag, it was 
credited to all the relevant hashtag categories. 
 
Analyzing sentiment on social media such as Twitter is 
difficult.[11], [12] Obviously, contributions using none of 
these hashtags are not captured in this data set. Tweets that 
use multiple hashtags are counted multiple times, and it is 
not uncommon for users to mix the use of hashtags. Each 
occurrence of a hashtag is counted separately, so one tweet 
with multiple hashtags could be in more than one group. 
These counts only include tweets where the text of the tweet 
contains one of the hashtags. This is the majority of the 
tweets, but it excludes the newer type of retweets in which a 
user comments and the original tweet is retweeted in the 
form of a URL.  
 
Understanding how #brexit is used illustrates how complex 
hashtag use is. It is a tricky hashtag because it has often been 
used to support both sides of the argument. For comparison, 
two recent tweets using the same hashtag encourage voters 
to do two different things:  
 
"If you're unsure how to vote in the 
UK Referendum just look at how 
Murdoch is voting & do the opposite. 
Vote to stay in the Union #brexit" 
 
"What #Brexit Could Mean for 
Travelers #UK #Ireland #Europe 
#Tourism 
http://www.tourismmarketer.com/arti
cles/europe/uk-and-ireland/what-
brexit-could-mean-for-travelers-
28352-thread.html…" 
 
These are exceptions—most instances of #brexit still 
accompany messages about leaving the EU. The second 
most popular #brexit hashtag (#voteleave) is still used three 
times more than the most frequent encouraging membership 
(#StrongerIn). The hashtag #voteleave appears 341,839 
times in the data set, while #StrongerIn appears 110,653 
times. But it is still worth noting the contrast, and 
computational social scientists do not yet understand the 
sampling parameters sufficiently to make many inferences 
about how opinion on social media translates to voter 
intent.[13]  
Table 1: Hashtag Use on Twitter, by Perspective on the UK Referendum 
Perspective N % 
Remain (#strongerin, #remain, #voteremain, #votein, #bremain, #labourin, #votestay, 
#intogether, #labourinforbritain, #greenerin) 
363,217 20 
Leave (#brexit, #voteleave, #leaveeu, #takecontrol, #betteroffout, #voteout, #beleave, 
#brexitthemovie, #euistheproblem, #brexitbustour) 
993,176 54 
Neutral (#euref, #eureferendum, #inorout, #eudebate, #june23) 475,233 26 
Occurrence of All Above Hashtags 1,831,626 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Twitter sample of these hashtags June 5-12, 2016. 
Note: This table reports the number of times these hashtags were used, not the number of tweets. 
4 
 
 
Unfortunately, not enough users geotag their profiles to 
allow analysis of the distribution of this support around the 
world or within Europe. Nonetheless, this data does reveal 
that users tweeting from the Brexit perspective (a) have 
generated a larger block of content and (b) are better at 
tagging their contributions so as to link messages to a larger 
argument and wider community of support.  
 
Second, to evaluate the role of bots in this debate, we 
organize clusters of opinion based on hashtag use. Table 2 
distinguishes between the messages that exclusively used a 
hashtag known to be associated with a perspective and then 
the combinations of mixed tagging that are possible. Then 
we create a subcategory of accounts that use heavy levels of 
automation. 
 
These accounts are often bots that see occasional human 
curation, or they are actively maintained by people who 
employ scheduling algorithms and other applications for 
automating social media communication. We define “heavy 
automation” as accounts that post at least 50 times a day, 
meaning 350 or more tweets during the data collection 
period. Extremely heavy human users might achieve this 
pace of social activity, especially if they are simply 
retweeting the content they find in their social media feed. 
And some bots may be relatively dormant, waiting to be 
activated and tweeting only occasionally. But this threshold 
generally captures accounts generating large traffic with 
some level of automation. Finally, self-disclosed bots were 
identified by searching for the term “bot” in either the tag or 
account description. While this is a small proportion of the 
overall accounts, we expect the actual number of bots to be 
higher—many bots, after all, would not disclose their 
activities. Future research will involve a more detailed 
analysis of the disclosed and hidden bots and searching for a 
wider range of terms referring to bots in the account name 
and description data. 
 
Third, to understand the distribution of content production 
across these users, we then look at segments of the total 
population of contributors to these hashtags. We find that the 
top 100 users generated more than 121,000 tweets during the 
week, which is about 8 percent of all Twitter traffic related 
to StrongerIn-Brexit. 
 
The most active users—the accounts that tweeted 100 or 
more times with a related hashtag during the week—
generated 32 percent of all Twitter traffic about Brexit. That 
volume is significant, considering that this number of posts 
was generated by fewer than 2,000 users in a collection of 
more than 300,000 users. In other words, less than 1 percent 
of the accounts generate almost a third of all the content. 
However, not all of these users or even the majority of them 
are bots. Anecdotally, it is difficult for human users to 
maintain this rapid pace of Twitter activity without some 
level of account automation. 
 
This table reveals that automation is used at several different 
levels by people taking different perspectives in the debate. 
The accounts using exclusively neutral hashtags are rarely 
automated (only 5.7 percent use heavy automation) while 
one-third of all the tweets using a mixture of all hashtags are 
generated by accounts that use heavy automation. Yet, 
surprisingly, only a fractional number of accounts disclose 
that they are in fact bots. 
 
Third, to evaluate the role of bots in generating traffic on 
StrongerIn-Brexit topics, we took a close look at the top 10 
accounts by volume, and all of them seem to use some level 
of automation. It is almost certain that 7 of the 10 accounts 
are bots. One of them is a UKIP-curated account most 
probably with some level of automation. Two of them seem 
to be bots that get some small amount of human curation. On 
the whole, these top users do not generate new content but 
simply retweet content from other users.  
Table 2: Twitter Content, by Hashtag Use and Level of Bot Automation 
 All Tweets Generated With 
Heavy Automation 
Generated By 
Disclosed Bots 
 N % N % N % 
Exclusively StrongerIn (number of tweets that used 
one or more of only #strongerin hashtags) 
186,279 14.6 28,075 15.1 196 0.1 
Exclusively Brexit (number of tweets that used one or 
more of only #brexit hashtags) 
662,745 51.8 97,431 14.7 842 0.1 
Exclusively Neutral (number of tweets that used one 
or more of only Neutral hashtags) 
234,170 18.3 13,436 5.7 253 0.1 
Mixed, Brexit-Neutral 69,322 5.4 11,667 16.8 72 0.1 
Mixed, StrongerIn-Neutral 35,412 2.8 5,099 14.4 44 0.1 
Mixed, Brexit-StrongerIn 49,556 3.9 9,735 19.6 89 0.2 
Mixed, Brexit-StrongerIn-Neutral 40,926 3.2 13,640 33.3 35 0.1 
Total 1,278,410 100.0 179,083 14.0 1,531 0.8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Twitter sample of these hashtags June 5-12, 2016. 
Note: Heavy automation refers to tweets generated by accounts that produce more than 50 tweets per day. Disclosed bots 
either use the term “bot” in the Twitter handle or make use of a known bot launching platform. 
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Keeping track of bots—especially political bots—requires 
careful understanding of how the design features of 
platforms may constrain the sampling strategy. Rather than 
trying to determine which specific tweet was generated by a 
bot, we look at the type of platform used to retweet or create 
a tweet to determine the probability that it was bot-
generated. Many of the accounts that are driven by a bot use 
bot-dominated platforms and normal platforms for tweeting 
activity. Indeed, some of the accounts that we identified as 
likely being bots have since been suspended by Twitter—the 
company also considered them to be bots. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We tend to think of the Internet in general, and social 
networks in particular, as connecting human beings. And it’s 
true that the Internet permits us to connect and convene at an 
unprecedented scale. But the Internet is also famously 
mediated. We do not reach one another directly so much as 
through a layer of technology—an interface, a platform, a 
network—that someone else has designed. What this means 
in part is that some of the personalities we encounter in 
cyberspace are not who or what they purport to be. In fact, 
people are increasingly agreeing, arguing, and even flirting 
with fleeting bits of code known as bots. 
 
It is no secret that citizens, journalists, and political leaders 
now make use of political bots—automated scripts that 
produce content and mimic real users. But it is not clear that 
average users can distinguish bot from human activity. 
Political campaigns are complex exercises in the creation, 
transmission, and mutation of significant political 
symbols.[14] Increasingly, political campaigns automate 
their messaging and many citizens who use social media are 
not always able to evaluate the sources of a message or 
critically assess the forcefulness of an argument. Fake social 
media accounts now spread pro-governmental messages, 
beef up website follower numbers, and cause artificial 
trends. Political strategists worldwide are using bot-
generated propaganda and misdirection. Research suggests 
that when digital media become an important part of civic 
engagement, social movements can generate immense 
amounts of content that cascade across public 
conversations—both across social media platforms and over 
international borders.[15] And increasingly, political elites 
have been learning and applying communication innovations 
by activists as tools for social control.  
 
The measures of undecided voters suggest that 30 percent of 
UK voters will decide how to vote in the week before the 
election, and half of these will decide on polling day.[16] 
The pervasive use of bots over social media heightens the 
risk of massive cascades of misinformation at a time when 
voters will be thinking about their options and canvasing 
their social networks for the sentiments of friends and 
family. 
 
Bots have been used by political actors around the world to 
attack opponents, choke off hashtags, and promote political 
platforms. During this sample period, however, we found 
that social media bots were used mostly for amplifying 
messages rather than argumentative engagement or even 
impression management. 
  
Robotic lobbying tactics have been deployed in many 
countries, including Russia, Mexico, China, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Bahrain, South Korea, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. 
Indeed, experts estimate that bot traffic now makes up over 
60 percent of all traffic online—up nearly 20 percent from 
two years prior.[17] 
 
Bots operate on many sensitive political topics during close 
electoral contests in many advanced democracies.[3], [18], 
[19] Political algorithms have become a powerful means of 
political communication for “astroturfing” movements—
defined as the managed perception of grassroots support.[20] 
In this way bots have become a means of managing citizens, 
They have gone from simply padding follower lists to 
retweeting volumes of their own commentary and 
announcements. In this analysis, we find that bots generate a 
noticeable portion of all the traffic about the UK referendum, 
very little of it original. Repeating this sample collection and 
study method over a longer time period and right around 
voting day would likely reveal additional features of bot 
activity on this topic. 
 
Bots are mostly used to retweet content about StrongerIn-
Brexit issues. It is difficult to say how much public opinion 
is shaped by political discourse on this topic over social 
media or what the influence of bots is on public sentiment. 
Nevertheless, we can identify the role that bot algorithms 
play in political communication around StrongerIn-Brexit 
issues. We find that political bots have a small but strategic 
role in the referendum conversations: (1) the family of 
hashtags associated with the argument for leaving the EU 
dominates, (2) different perspectives on the issue utilize 
different levels of automation, and (3) less than 1 percent of 
sampled accounts generate almost a third of all the messages. 
 
 
ABOUT THE TEAM 
Philip N. Howard is a Statutory Professor in the Oxford 
Internet Institute at the University of Oxford. He has 
published eight books and over 100 academic articles, book 
chapters, conference papers, and commentary essays on 
information technology, international affairs and public life. 
Howard is the author of The Managed Citizen (Cambridge, 
2006), the Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 
(Oxford, 2010), and most recently of Pax Technica: How the 
Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up (Yale, 
2015). He blogs at www.philhoward.org and tweets from 
@pnhoward. 
 
6 
 
Bence Kollanyi is a PhD student in Sociology at the 
Corvinus University of Budapest currently living in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. He is also studying political bots in 
the Computational Propaganda project at the Oxford Internet 
Institute. His research focuses on automation of social media 
accounts, including the development of open-source bots, 
and their deployment on Twitter and other social media 
platforms. He tweets from @bencekollanyi. 
 
ABOUT THE PROJECT 
The Project on Computational Propaganda 
(www.politicalbots.org) involves an international, 
interdisciplinary team of researchers investigating the 
impact of automated scripts—computational propaganda—
on public life. We track social bots and use perspectives from 
organizational sociology, human computer interaction, 
communication, and political science to interpret and 
analyze the evidence we are gathering. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND FUNDING DISCLOSURE 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the 
National Science Foundation, “EAGER CNS: 
Computational Propaganda and the Production/Detection of 
Bots,” BIGDATA-1450193, 2014-16, Philip N. Howard, 
Principal Investigator. The research leading to these results 
has received funding from the European Research Council 
under the European Union's Consolidator Award #648311. 
Project activities were approved by the University of 
Washington Human Subjects Committee, approval #48103-
EG. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of either 
the National Science Foundation or European Research 
Council. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] A. Chen, “The Agency,” The New York Times, 02-
Jun-2015. 
[2] M. C. Forelle, P. N. Howard, A. Monroy-Hernandez, 
and S. Savage, “Political Bots and the Manipulation 
of Public Opinion in Venezuela,” Social Science 
Research Network, Rochester, NY, SSRN Scholarly 
Paper ID 2635800, Jul. 2015. 
[3] S. Woolley and P. N. Howard, “Bots Unite to 
Automate the Presidential Election,” WIRED, vol. 24, 
no. 5, 15-May-2016. 
[4] P. N. Howard, Pax Technica: How the Internet of 
Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2015. 
[5] “Carna botnet,” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 24-
Nov-2015. 
[6] A. Samuel, “How Bots Took Over Twitter,” Harvard 
Business Review, 19-Jun-2015. . 
[7] R. Dubbin, “The Rise of Twitter Bots,” The New 
Yorker. 
[8] A. Monroy-Hernández, danah boyd, E. Kiciman, M. 
De Choudhury, and S. Counts, “The New War 
Correspondents: The Rise of Civic Media Curation in 
Urban Warfare,” in Proceedings of the 2013 
Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative 
Work, San Antonio, Texas, USA, 2013. 
[9] F. Morstatter, J. Pfeffer, H. Liu, and K. M. Carley, “Is 
the Sample Good Enough? Comparing Data from 
Twitter’s Streaming API with Twitter’s Firehose,” 
arXiv:1306.5204 [physics], Jun. 2013. 
[10] “How Can I Get All Retweets of a Specific Tweet?,” 
Twitter Developers. [Online]. Available: 
https://twittercommunity.com/t/how-can-i-get-all-
retweets-of-a-specific-tweet/11602. [Accessed: 17-
Jul-2015]. 
[11] Z. Chu, S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, and S. Jajodia, 
“Who is Tweeting on Twitter: human, bot, or 
cyborg?,” in Proceedings of the 26th annual computer 
security applications conference, 2010, pp. 21–30. 
[12] Cook, David, Waugh, Benjamin, Abdinpanah, 
Maldini, Hashimi, Omid, and Rahman, Shaquille 
Abdul, “Twitter Deception and Influence: Issues of 
Identity, Slacktivism, and Puppetry,” Journal of 
Information Warfare, vol. 13, no. 1. 
[13] P. T. Metaxas, E. Mustafaraj, and D. Gayo-Avello, 
“How (Not) to Predict Elections,” in 2011 IEEE Third 
International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk 
and Trust (PASSAT) and 2011 IEEE Third 
International Conference on Social Computing 
(SocialCom), 2011, pp. 165–171. 
[14] P. N. Howard, “Digitizing the social contract: 
Producing American political culture in the age of 
new media,” The Communication Review, vol. 6, no. 
3, pp. 213–245, 2003. 
[15] P. N. Howard, “The Arab Spring’s cascading effects,” 
Pacific Standard, vol. 23, 2011. 
[16] T. Helm, “Third of EU referendum voters won’t make 
up their minds until week before poll,” The Guardian, 
11-Jun-2016. 
[17] J. Condliffe, “Over 60 Percent of Internet Traffic Is 
Now Driven By Bots,” Gizmodo. [Online]. Available: 
http://gizmodo.com/over-60-percent-of-internet-
traffic-is-now-driven-by-bo-1482537192. [Accessed: 
16-Jun-2016]. 
[18] D. W. Butrymowicz, “Loophole.com: How the FEC’s 
Failure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines 
Campaign Finance Law,” Columbia Law Review, pp. 
1708–1751, 2009. 
[19] K. R. McKelvey and F. Menczer, “Truthy: enabling 
the study of online social networks,” in Proceedings 
of the 2013 conference on Computer supported 
cooperative work companion, 2013, pp. 23–26. 
[20] P. N. Howard, New Media Campaigns and the 
Managed Citizen. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
